SSPO Membership Meeting

October 11, 2005

Hamilton Convention Centre

 

            The meeting was chaired by Paul Wendling of SSPO, who introduced our speaker and counsel, Murray Gold, of Koskie Minsky.  Murray made the following presentation after which there was a Question and Answer session in which Murray was assisted by our Financial Advisor, Gus Tertigas of RSM Richter.

 

 I.        ACTIONS TO DATE

1.            Protection of Existing Benefits - Under the Initial CCAA Order, Stelco was authorized to unilaterally reduce or terminate retiree health benefits. The Salaried Retirees brought a motion to change the Order so that such reductions could only be made with the prior approval of the Court; Stelco agreed that it would not unilaterally reduce retiree benefits without first returning to Court for the hearing of our motion.

2.            Protection of Retirees at Subsidiaries - The Salaried Retirees brought a motion to determine that Stelco and its subsidiaries (especially Stelwire, Stelpipe, Welland Pipe and CHT Steel) would be considered as a "single employer" such that no group of retirees could be isolated and dealt with separately from the others. We have been successful - as part of its agreement with the Province, Stelco has agreed to take responsibility for retiree benefits at each of its subsidiaries where a purchaser does not assume such responsibility.           

 

3.            Revocation of Section 5.1 - Under section 5.1, Stelco Pension Plans have deteriorated from fully funded to a collective solvency deficiency in excess of $1.3 billion. The Salaried Retirees wrote the Premier, met with Jim Arnett (the Premier's designated Steel Industry advisor) as well as with a number of Liberal members of the Legislative Assembly, to press for Stelco's resumption of solvency funding. We have been successful in persuading the Provincial Government to replace section 5.1 with a requirement that Stelco fund its solvency deficiencies.

4.            Keiper and Woollcombe - The Salaried Retirees were the first to draw to the stakeholders' attention the risks attendant to the appointment of Messrs. Keiper and Woollcombe to Stelco's Board of Directors. Ultimately, these two directors resigned from the Board, shortly after which the current restructuring agreements were reached between Stelco and the Province, Stelco and the USW and Stelco and Tricap.

5.            Negotiations Protocol - Until recently, Stelco's Board had been trying to formulate its own plan without including the Province in its considerations. The Salaried Retirees urged Stelco to begin their restructuring discussions with the Province - since it controls the legal environment for pension funding - and then to formulate a plan together with the other stakeholders. Ultimately, this is what Stelco did, resulting in the current proposed arrangements.

II.            CURRENT RESTRUCTURING PROPOSAL

1.         In evaluating a restructuring proposal, two questions are important:

(a)       Will the Company be Viable? - How much debt will it have? How much liquidity (cash and credit)? Will it have too much debt/little liquidity to weather a downturn? Will it have adequate resources for its needed capital expenditures? Will it be a high or low cost producer?

(b)       What Happens if Stelco Becomes Insolvent Again? - In this insolvency, all of Stelco's creditors are unsecured, and so rank equally in the event of a liquidation. However, this restructuring is creating new secured financing - what would the impact of this secured financing (which ranks ahead of unsecured creditors) be in a subsequent insolvency?

2.         Under any plan, Stelco would emerge with a $600 million asset backed line of credit, secured against its inventory and receivables.

3.         Under Stelco's agreements with the Province, Tricap and the USW, Stelco would emerge with the following additional financing:

(a)       $100 million from the Province of Ontario; interest rate of 1%; interest payable either in cash or in common shares; 75% of the loan obligation is forgiven if, by December 31, 2015, Stelco's existing solvency deficiencies have been fully paid;

(b)       $350 million secured loan from Tricap; matures in seven years, interest payable in cash at a variable rate equal to the thirty day bankers acceptance rate plus 675 basis points for the first seven years, and an increased rate thereafter;

(c)        $75 - $100 million standby commitment from Tricap to purchase secured convertible notes due 2015.

4.         In order to access the Province's $100 million loan, Stelco must make a $400 million pay-down to its main Pension Plans (two salaried and two bargaining unit), make normal course pension payments to the Plans (in 2005) and then pay $60 million into the Plans per year for five years and $70 million per year for the following five years.

 

5.       In order to access the Provincial and Tricap loans, Stelco’s liquidity must be at least $625 million.

 

6.         Under the Stelco Plan, existing unsecured debt (worth approximately $666 million) is exchanged for:

(a)       $225 million of new secured convertible notes; 9.5% interest rate payable in cash or new common shares at Stelco's option, convertible to equity upon maturity;

(b)       $300 million in new convertible unsecured notes, interest rate at 5% payable in cash or new convertible 5% notes, and convertible into common shares once the Local 1005 collective bargaining agreement is in effect or the share per price is at $15.00 or higher for twenty days;

   (c)        1.1 million new common shares;

   (d)       Rights to purchase $75 million in additional new secured convertible notes.

7.            Assuming a collective agreement with Local 1005, Stelco will have, under this plan, $225 million (plus fees) in secured debt to the bondholders (BH), up to $350 million in secured debt to Tricap, and up to $600 million in secured debt under the Asset-Based Loan. It is unlikely that Stelco will draw on the entire $350 million loan form Tricap, or that it will draw much from its $600 million ABL. It will be able to pay common shares instead of cash as interest on its secured loan to the BH and its unsecured loan to the Province, and new unsecured notes instead of cash as interest on its unsecured note to the BH. If all goes well, then the $225 million in secured debt to the BH will be converted to equity, and if the pension debt is retired by 2015, the $100 million Provincial loan will be largely (75%) forgiven, with the balance converted to common shares.

8.         On a cash-flow basis, Stelco's ability to pay all of its interest (except on the Tricap loan) in new common shares or new unsecured notes relieves it of a potentially burdensome interest expense.

III.        NEXT STEPS

1.         The BH are currently opposed to the Plan. They want less cash into the Pension Plans up front ($200 million versus $400 million) and more cash in subsequent years ($10 million more per year for the next ten years). They want more secured debt for themselves $350 million versus $225 million), and they want less of the debt to be convertible into equity than under the Stelco Plans, and to be convertible only if tougher conditions are met. They generally want higher interest rates than Stelco proposes to pay, and they want interest paid in cash, rather than in common shares and new unsecured notes.

2.            Overall, the BH want to be much better protected in the event that Stelco fails a second time, and also want much higher cash interest payments than Stelco has proposed to pay. The BH assume the Province and the USW will go along with their demands; this is unlikely.

3.         There is also a dispute between the BH and the company as to how Stelco's Board of Directors will be selected. Tricap requires, as a condition of its $350 million loan, that Stelco's Board be acceptable to it, while the BH want to control the Board themselves. Control of the Board may be important since it is the Board that determines whether interest payments are made in cash, or in common shares or new unsecured notes.

4.         Under the CCAA, creditors who are 'affected' by the restructuring (i.e. suffer a loss) are entitled to vote on the Plan. The BH have said they will vote against it. If they do, the Plan may be revised, or Stelco may move into bankruptcy with difficult and employment/environment consequences. Bankruptcy is governed by a different statute - the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act. Reforms to it may be required.

IV.            PENSION FUNDING DEAL

1.         The current solvency deficiency for Stelco's four main Plans is probably between $1.3 and $1.5 billion. A $400 million pay down should eliminate about 30% of the deficiency. However, payments over the next ten years are fixed at $60 million per year for the first five years, and $70 million per year for the five years after that, with an additional "cash-sweep" beginning in 2008. These payments include the costs of current service accruing in those years, as well the cost of paying down the existing deficiencies. Any new benefits must be funded with additional payments in accordance with normal pension funding rules. Without the cash-sweep contribution, these payments are lower than would be required under normal Pension Benefits Act ("PBA") rules, even with the section 5.1 election in place.

 

2.        Because the payments are fixed, the pension plans are at risk if pension costs are higher than expected, or the investment return on pension assets is less than 7% after expenses.  In either case, normal pension funding rules would require additional contributions to make up for the additional costs or poor investment returns; however, under this payment agreement, Stelco’s payments are fixed for the next ten years and do not increase if pension costs are higher than expected or asset returns are lower than assumed.

 

3          The Provincial Government’s promise to forgive 75% of its $100 million loan to Stelco in 2015 if the solvency deficit is fully funded will, however, act as an incentive for the company to fund its pension deficiencies by that date.

 

 

QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION

 

Q         The total contribution to the pension plans required by the proposed restructuring plan do not seem to add up to the solvency deficiency of about $1.3 to 1.5 billion.  Is this correct?

 

A         It is correct.  The planned payments add up to $1.05 billion and do not take into account the service charges. There are two additional factors:

·        Workers whose age plus service add up to 55 or more are entitled under Ontario law to what is called the “grow-in” benefit.  This means that if there is a plant shut-down before they are eligible to retire they can continue to accrue service and credit as though they were still working.  This is very costly for the company.  However, when the workers become entitled to the benefit the grow-in payments disappear.  In Stelco’s plans the value of the grow-in benefit is very significant but as the workers age the grow-in disappears and the solvency deficiency will shrink.

·        In addition to the $1.05 billion payment to the plans there is something called the “cash sweep”.  This is an amount that is put into the pension plans after 2008 if there is “free cash flow”  (a defined term under the agreement) in excess of a certain level.  Above that level 20% will be paid into the pensions.

 

But at the end of the day the numbers may not work and there is no guarantee that the $1.3 to 1.5 billion will be paid.  We have asked the company, the Monitor and the government for their calculations showing us exactly how all these numbers are going to add up to $1.3 to 1.5 billion but we do not have them yet. 

 

Q         Has SSPO taken any action to correct improper assumptions used in calculating the pension fund requirements?

 

A         Early on we complained that Stelco had underestimated the cost of the pensions, i.e. that the mortality assumption underestimated the life expectancy of pensioners.  Stelco has not changed that assumption so this is one of the risks they have not addressed in their pension funding plan.  In the normal course, if pensioners live longer than expected a higher contribution to the plans would be triggered.  In the current case the contributions are fixed by the restructuring plan.

 

Q         If, in the future, Stelco does not have enough money to make the required payments into the pension plans, what happens?

 

A         If Stelco does not have enough money to contribute the required $60 or $70 million per year we have another crisis.  In that case Stelco may go to the Provincial government and seek relief but the $60 or $70 million payments have been fixed by the financial analysts as reasonable and affordable.  Earlier Stelco plans required much higher contributions in the $100 million area.

 

Q         Is the $1.3 to $1.5 billion shortfall for pensions only or for pensions and health benefits?

A         It is the solvency underfunding for pensions only.

 

Q         Is there a formula for how the $400 million to the pension plans is distributed?

 

A         There will need to be a formula but one does not currently exist.  The Provincial government will be involved in the allocation of the $400 million.

 

Q         What is the current level of funding in the salaried pension plans and would the pensions be reduced by the percentage underfunding in the event of a Stelco liquidation?

 

A         The funding level is somewhat less than 80%.  In the event of a Stelco liquidation the Provincial guarantee fund would kick in and would guarantee a certain portion of the pension and only the underfunding above that level would be at risk.  You should not worry about this unlikely eventuality.

 

Q         Will the salaried pensioners have some sort of representation on Stelco’s pension committee?

 

A         No.  Stelco’s pension plan is run by Stelco, as is virtually every other company’s pension plan in Ontario.  There are some organizations, public and private, where the union has gained seats on the board governing the pension plan but it has not happened in the industrial sector.  For salaried employees who do not have a collective bargaining avenue it is virtually impossible.  However, SSPO is talking to SASSEA about the formation of a Pension Advisory Committee and this will be discussed by Paul Wendling later.

 

Q         Why do we not know the level of funding in the Stelco plans after 2003?

 

A         We do know but confidentiality agreements prevent us from making the information public.  While the stock market did well after 2003, long term interest rates fell and this had an adverse effect on the price of annuities that would be purchased if the pension plans were wound up.

 

Q         With the proposed plan, to what degree would the bondholders control the company, the composition of the Board and the senior officers?

 

A         Initially the unsecured creditors will control 100% of the company but we don’t know what the future ownership will look like.  We expect that there will be an argument between Tricap and the bondholders as to who controls the Board of Directors, which will effect whether the interest paid to the bondholders is in shares or cash.  The fight to control Stelco’s Board will be between the bondholders on one side and pretty much everyone else on the other.

 

Q         What is the situation for the retiree health benefits?

A         There are no proposed changes to the retiree health plan.  The Ontario law tends to ensure that the non-pension benefits given to employees are vested on retirement and cannot be taken away.

 

Q         What will Stelco’s pension obligations be after 10 years?

 

A         Stelco will then have to abide by the same rules as everybody else which are solvency funding in 5 years and going-concern funding in 15 years.

 

Q         What is the situation for pensioners of a subsidiary if the subsidiary is sold off and then goes bankrupt?

 

A         We are assuming, based on past discussions, that if Stelwire, for example, is sold, Stelco will retain the retiree liabilities.  That is the precedent set by the sale of Stelpipe.  This issue was of concern to us and that is why we brought a motion to have all subsidiary employers declared common employers.

 

Q         Is there a possibility of the Provincial or Federal government stepping in to force the bondholders to an agreement?  Also, why has the Federal government not been more active in supporting the Provincial government?

 

A         You have put your finger on the key issue that the fate of a lot of people hangs on a vote of a few bond funds who are in this for a quick buck.  But that is the way the system is currently structured.  If the bondholders want more than is there, the next step will be to ask the Federal government to change the bankruptcy laws so that they would no longer have that kind of power.

 

WRAP-UP

 

Paul Wendling wrapped up the meeting by mentioning discussions taking place between SASSEA and SSPO on the formation of a Pension Advisory Committee.  The terms of reference for this committee are being formulated by our lawyers.  This committee would monitor the administration of our pension plans so that any significant events could be communicated to the members and we could make recommendations to the pension board.